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Abstract
Background: Young women in conflict-affected regions are at risk of a number of adverse outcomes as a result of
violence, economic deterioration and the breakdown of community structures and services. This paper presents the
findings of a systematic review of quantitative literature reporting how key sexual and reproductive health (SRH)
outcomes among young women under the age of 20 years are affected by exposure to armed conflict; namely,
sexual debut, first marriage and first birth. Increases in these outcomes among young women are all associated
with potential negative public health consequences. It also examines and documents possible causal pathways for
any changes seen.
Methods: To fit with our inclusion criteria, all reviewed studies included outcomes for comparable populations not
exposed to conflict either temporally or spatially. A total of 19 studies with results from 21 countries or territories
met our inclusion criteria; seven presented findings on marriage, four on fertility and eight on both of these
outcomes. Only one study reporting on sexual debut met our criteria.
Results: Findings show clear evidence of both declines and increases in marriage and childbirth among young
women in a range of conflict-affected settings. Several studies that showed increases in marriage below the age of
20 years reported that such increases were concentrated in the younger teenagers. Trends in fertility were
predominantly driven by marriage patterns. Suggested causal pathways for the changes observed could be
grouped into three categories: involuntary, gender and psycho-social and economic and material factors.
Conclusion: The review reveals a paucity of literature on the impact of conflict on SRH outcomes of young
women. Further quantitative and qualitative studies are needed to explore how conflict influences SRH events in
young women over both the short- and longer-term.
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Background
Young women living in conflict affected countries face
risks that are likely to have negative effects on their sex-
ual health and wellbeing. Violence, deterioration of eco-
nomic conditions, poor access to services and
breakdown of community norms place them at risk of
sexual violence, forced marriage, transactional and/or
coerced sex, and other risky sexual behaviours. However,
quantitative evidence is rarely presented to support these
reports of increased risks, and much of the increasing
awareness of how conflict impacts on the reproductive
health of girls and young women is derived from rela-
tively small scale qualitative data, including case studies
[1–3]. These studies provide highly valuable individual-
level insights but cannot assess the scale of the impact at
either a population level or for vulnerable sub-groups.
For example, many qualitative reports and media cover-
age suggests that conflict increases the incidence of child
marriage, but there is little evidence from quantitative
studies.
In order to explore this issue we carried out of a sys-
tematic review of quantitative literature that reported
how three key sexual and reproductive health (SRH) out-
comes among young women under the age of 20 years -
sexual debut, first marriage and first birth - are affected
by exposure to armed conflict in a number of countries
and settings. These three indicators are all known to
have potential negative health and social consequences
when they occur at an early age, and thus a knowledge
of whether the incidence of these events changes in this
context is important for guiding programmes designed
to protect and support women in conflict and post-
conflict environments. The time when sexual activity
commences marks the beginning of a young person’s ex-
posure to a number of adverse reproductive outcomes;
for example, early sexual debut is associated with in-
creased risk of unintended pregnancy and sexually trans-
mitted infections (STIs), including HIV [4, 5]. In many
cultures, marriage before the 20th birthday is common;
while this may be viewed as a positive transition by the
community and, in many cases, the young woman her-
self, child marriage (defined as marriage under the age
of 18 [6]) is associated with a number of adverse health
outcomes [7] as well as educational, and socio-economic
disadvantage [8]. The increased risk of maternal mortal-
ity faced by adolescent women is probably less severe or
widespread than previously believed [9], but increased
risk to the infant is well documented [10]. In addition to
physical and socio-economic risk, early childbearing,
particularly outside marriage, may also lead to stigma-
tisation and isolation in some contexts [11].
As well as presenting the findings from the included
studies, we explore the suggested pathways through
which conflict may affect these outcomes in order to
shed light on how impacts may vary within different
contexts. We also discuss the quality of research in this
area and suggest ways that further evidence can be de-
veloped and strengthened.
Method
Procedure
Our systematic review followed a defined protocol to re-
duce bias and ensure replicability. Initially, six electronic
databases were searched: Medline/Pubmed, ASSIA/Pro-
quest, CINAHL, EMBASE, African Index Medicus and
Reproductive Health Library. As well as peer reviewed
articles, our inclusion criteria allowed for theses, disser-
tations, reports and grey literature as long as data
sources used were clearly referenced, so searches were
also conducted using Zetoc and search engines such as
Google. Websites of relevant United Nations and non-
governmental organisations and networks were hand
searched, along with references from identified papers.
Studies using any quantitative methodologies were in-
cluded as long as they met the other criteria, but purely
qualitative studies were excluded.
Our search terms are shown in Additional file 1:
Appendix 1. Only articles written in English from
1970 onwards were eligible for inclusion in the
search. Our initial database and hand search yielded a
total of 1298 documents once duplicates were re-
moved. Details of all papers identified from the initial
search were uploaded onto Eppi-reviewer (http://eppi.ioe.a-
c.uk/). Two reviewers (SN and NS) carried out initial
screening of all identified studies by title and abstract. Fifty
studies judged to be potentially eligible for inclusion and
complete articles and reports were then retrieved.
Inclusion of studies
These sources were reviewed independently by two au-
thors (SN and NS) to ascertain whether they met the eli-
gibility criteria. Any disagreement was resolved by
discussion with added input as required from the third
author (RI); there was an initial agreement rate of over
90 %. In cases of uncertainty, the authors of the papers
were contacted for clarification.
The inclusion criteria allowed for several different
measures of change of age at first sex, age at marriage
and age at first birth within our age range of interest
(see Table 1). Changes in median or mean age were not
accepted, as these did not automatically reflect a change
in age of the event for our specific age group. Studies
showing change in risk or odds for an age group wider
than under 20 years (e.g. 15–24) were excluded.
Studies were only included if they reported compar-
able outcomes for populations identified as exposed or
not exposed to a conflict that was clearly documented as
active during the period of measurement in the study;
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databases from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program were
used to clarify this (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/).
Only conflicts after 1970 were included, as we wanted to
focus on the impacts of recent conflicts and data quality
from historical studies is difficult to verify. Exposure could
be measured by temporal, geographical or individual level
data, or be based on specific impacts of conflict on sub-
populations (e.g. displacement). However, to ensure that
the comparator was appropriate, studies measuring out-
comes amongst displaced people were only included if the
comparison population was from the same country of ori-
gin. In terms of temporal exposure, we included studies
that presented findings for pre-conflict and in-conflict, and
in-conflict and post-conflict. In several cases, the acute
period of the conflict was too short to measure change (i.e.
the Rwandan genocide) so in cases where the period of
conflict was less than one year we included measurements
pre- and within the first five years post-conflict.
Data extraction and quality assessment
Data extraction was carried out using a structured for-
mat which drew on the recommendations of the
STROBE guidelines for reporting observational research
[12]. The information extracted included:
 country/region/date of study period;
 description of the populations studied (exposed and
non-exposed);
 description of the conflict (including categories of
conflict type and intensity developed by the Uppsala
conflict project);
 data source and sampling;
 study design/methodology;
 method of measuring exposure to conflict; and
 results – i.e. change in outcome, and any suggested
causal pathway
A checklist tool for rating quality was developed based
on recommended practice [13, 14] and studies were rated
for quality based on such factors as sample selection and
size, measurement methods for outcome, methodology,
adjustment for other confounding factors, method of
measuring exposure to conflict and description of popula-
tion/conflict environment. However, all studies were in-
cluded regardless of their assessed quality.
An initial scoping exercise of the published research lit-
erature highlighted substantial heterogeneity in country
contexts, study designs, study aims and objectives, data
sources and conflict comparators utilised. Comparison and
appraisal of these types of studies is invariably complex
and calls for flexible use of the published guidelines on sys-
tematic reviews; it would have been inappropriate to have
attempted a statistical meta-analysis. We therefore chose a
narrative synthesis approach for reporting patterns of
change in our chosen indicators. The heterogeneity of con-
texts also meant that we considered it important to not just
document the change in indicator, but also the proposed
pathway by which this change came about. In addition to
our narrative synthesis, we conducted a combined frame-
work and thematic synthesis of suggested possible path-
ways when these were included in the literature. This
enabled a better understanding of the key concepts and di-
mensions seen in diverse contexts concerning the impact
of conflict on the selected outcomes.
We based our initial analysis of causal pathways on a
framework presented by Staveteig [15], which identifies four
groups of factors that can influence the outcomes - involun-
tary factors, material and economic factors, sex and gender
roles and psychosocial factors, although we later merged sex
and gender roles and psychosocial factors for our analysis as
many cultural factors seemed to straddle both categories.
Reading the abstracts and, subsequently, the full texts of the
studies allowed us to identify new and emerging themes.
Results
Description of the articles
We identified 21 articles, representing 19 unique studies,
which presented SRH outcome data over a period of
armed conflict. Studies that overlapped on country and
time periods were deemed to be different if they were by
different authors, used different data sources or pre-
sented markedly different findings. In two cases there
were two papers each linked to one study [16–19]; since
slightly different data and context are presented in these
Table 1 Summary of outcome measures defined by inclusion criteria
Outcome Measures included in study
Age at first sex Percentages of women reporting sexual debut before the age of 20 years
Odds ratio or relative risk of first sex by a specified age of below 20 years
Age at first marriage/union Percentages of women reporting first marriage/union the age of 20 years
Odds ratio or relative risk of first marriage/union by a specified age of below 20 years
Age at first birth Age specific fertility rates 15–19 (or for other age grouping with upper limit below 20 years)
Percentages of women reporting age at first birth by a specified age of below 20 years
Odds ratio or relative risk of first birth by a specified age of below 20 years
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papers we cite both in relation to each study. However,
we usually refer to numbers of studies rather than num-
bers of papers to overcome the bias related to multiple
papers from the same study. A Prisma Flowchart is in-
cluded as Additional file 2: Appendix 2. The articles cov-
ered 14 different settings; Table 2 provides a summary of
the primary focus of the research and geographical
region.
The specification of age grouping within our sample
group of interest (under 20 years) varied between the
studies; this may reflect the status of women, the legal
age of marriage and the childbearing patterns within the
countries studied. The majority used 15 to 19 years;
however, several studies also included data for younger
women or disaggregated age groupings further (for ex-
ample [16, 17, 20–25]).
As shown in Additional file 3: Appendix 3 (available
online), the majority of studies presented a temporal
comparison of the possible impact of conflict before and
during conflict or before, during and after conflict. One
study examined exposure to conflict based on the num-
ber of child abductions in Nepal [24], and a further
study compared outcomes amongst young women living
in displaced persons’ camps with those in surrounding
villages in Uganda [23]. Data from Save the Children
combined refugee status with a temporal analysis, com-
paring the percentages of women married before aged
20 in Syria before the war to Syrian young women now
living in Jordan refugee camps [25].
All but one study used existing data sources, in-
cluding Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) or
World Fertility Survey (WFS), Census Data, vital
registration and national living standards surveys. The
remaining study collected primary data on sexual de-
but by use of a structured questionnaire [23]. Simple
cohort and/or period trend analyses were presented
in the majority of studies, using a range of outcomes
including percentages of women married (or unmar-
ried) by a certain age, and age specific fertility or
marriage rates. Hazard ratio probabilities or relative
risks were used in two studies [22, 24] and logistic
regression was used in one paper [16].
Of the 21 papers (based on 19 studies) 12 were rated
as low quality and nine were rated as moderate. Limita-
tions are outlined more fully in the discussion; however,
it must be recognised that in a number of the papers the
outcome of interest to our review was not the main
focus of the research, and was presented as descriptive
Table 2 Number of studies by setting and sexual health outcome (NB A number of studies provided data for two countries or
territories)
Number of studies Sexual debut Marriage Fertility
Middle East
Iran 2 - Y Y
Lebanon 1 - Y -
West Bank 4 - Y Y
Gaza 4 Y Y
Syria 1 - Y -
Eastern Europe
Bosnia 1 - Y Y
Central and Southern Asia
Tajikistan 2* - Y Y
Bangladesh 1 - - Y
Nepal 1 - Y -
Eastern Asia
Cambodia 2 - Y Y
Northern Africa
Mali 1 - Y Y
Eritrea 2* - Y Y
Southern Africa
Rwanda 1 Y Y
Uganda 1 Y - -
Total 21*
*This table refers to the number of papers rather than the number of unique studies on which they area based
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data (sometimes as a line graph) to support a more com-
prehensive analysis of other outcomes or as a subsection
of a wider study.
A summary of findings is provided in Additional file 4:
Appendix 4 (available online).
Sexual debut
Only one study fitted our selection criteria and de-
scribed the impact of conflict on young women’s sex-
ual debut. Okae [23] compared data on sexual debut
of young people within IDP camps in the Lira region,
Uganda, to those of young people in the surrounding
settlements. Differences were not substantial, but were
larger amongst young men than amongst young
women.
Impact of conflict on marriage
Using the themes included in the Staveteig framework,
the factors proposed as being associated with either in-
creases or declines in marriage rates could be labelled as
belonging to one of the three following groupings: (i)
material and economic (e.g. lack of basic resources), (ii)
involuntary (e.g. displacement and mortality), and (iii)
gender and psychosocial (e.g. increased pro-natalism).
The majority of studies identified more than one causal
factor across the groupings.
Increase in marriage
In six studies, an increase in marriage was reported
during a period of conflict [15–17, 22, 24–26]. In
some cases, these increases were quite marked; for in-
stance, Save the Children [25] reported that the pro-
portion of registered marriages in Jordan among
Syrian under-18 refugee women had risen from 12 %
in 2011 (roughly the same as the figure in pre-war
Syria) to 18 % 1 year later.
A number of the pathways suggested for potential
impact fall within the gender and psycho-social
grouping. Clifford [22] and Shemyakina [16, 19] both
reported an increase in marriage in young women
aged between 15 and 17 years during the peak years
of the hostilities in Tajikistan. Parental fear that a
young woman’s honour could be tainted in times of
conflict was reported by both authors as a key reason.
Save the Children’s study in Syria [25] also suggested
protection of a young woman’s honour was a driving
force for increasing early marriage. In Mali, Randall
[26] showed that the proportion of first marriages in-
volving very young (below 15 years old) Tuareg girls
increased during the conflict years, with levels only
reverting to those seen pre-conflict after the war
ended. The author concluded that early marriage pro-
vided protection for young women against premarital
pregnancy. Further, the refugee camps enhanced both
the desire and opportunity for improved social cohe-
sion, and reinforced old family alliances and created
new ones, resulting in increased first marriage rates
among the very young. Valente [24] used regression
techniques with large survey data to show that expos-
ure to increased intensity of conflict in Nepal was as-
sociated with an increased probability of marriage
before 15 years.
The study in Syria also suggested an economic elem-
ent to the changes observed, arguing that many of the
marriages for young women in refugees camps were
deemed transactional by parents, frequently occurring
with older men and seen as a way of securing financial
sponsorship of their daughters [25].
Staveteig [15] analysed data from the 2000 and
2005 Rwandan DHS to demonstrate acceleration in
marital timing among the birth cohort aged between
15 and 19 years at the time of the genocide. This was
contrary to what had been expected given the demo-
graphic transitions occurring within the country and
the practice of early marriage becoming increasingly
less common. Later cohorts (post-conflict) then ap-
peared to revert back to the expected trend of in-
creasing age at marriage. The author suggests that
the change observed may have been due to involun-
tary factors as young women entered the marriage
market earlier than normal in response to the re-
duced availability of male partners. Further, many of
the additional marriages were deemed more likely to
be primarily transactional, following orphanhood and
the destruction of homes and livelihoods.
In four studies there was a clear pattern of younger teen-
agers experiencing increased rates of marriage, which was
not evident among older teenagers [16, 17, 22, 24, 26]. In
Tajikistan, both Shemyakina [16, 17] and Clifford [22]
found that marriages at the ‘peak’ age of 18 to 20 years
(which takes this group out of the age range for our review)
actually declined somewhat during the conflict. Randall’s
study in Mali [26] failed to detect any increase in marriage
for the 15 to 18 age group despite a marked increase for
girls below 15 years and, in Nepal, Valente [24] did not de-
tect an increased probability of marriage for those below 18
or 20 years despite documenting increased risk for those
under 15 years of age.
A somewhat conflicting finding presented in one of
Shemyakina’s papers [16] is that regression analysis sug-
gested that those within the ‘war cohort’ who reached
prime marriage age during the conflict and who resided
in the most war-affected regions were actually less likely
to be married by 18 years. This could suggest that, al-
though at a national level marriage before aged 18 in-
creased, particularly at the outset of the war, marriages
were concentrated in the areas less directly affected by
the conflict.
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Decline in marriage
In other contexts, a decline in marriage was observed
during a period of conflict [15, 18, 19, 21, 27–30]. Ad-
verse material and economic conditions were commonly
cited as key factors affecting the decline observed. For
example, Saxena et al. [21] examined nuptuality trends
and patterns in Lebanon during civil war. The propor-
tion of married young women aged between 15 and
19 years declined from 13 to 5 % between 1970 and
1996. The authors concluded that the civil war made it
difficult for young people to find employment and af-
fordable housing so delayed getting married. Further,
women were frequently confined to the home during pe-
riods of intense violence resulting in a decline in the op-
portunity to meet potential partners. Khawaja et al. [30]
examined changes in marriage rates during the second
Intifada using survey data from 1996 to 2005. The per-
centage of young women aged between 15 and 19 years
who were married declined from 30.3 to 14.6 between
1995 and 2004 in Gaza, and from 21 to 12 over the same
period in the West Bank, possibly as a result of the high
costs of marriage.
In other cases, involuntary and sex ratio factors were
cited as the main reasons for marriage postponement,
and the unavailability of marriage partners either
through excess mortality, migration or conscription ap-
peared to reduce marriage rates. Woldemiceal [18, 19]
speculated that the decline in Eritrea in the percentage
of 15 to 19 year old women ever married from 38 to 31
between 1995 and 2002 was due to the mass mobilisa-
tion of young men to fight in the border conflict with
Ethiopia. Blanc [27] supported these findings.
In Cambodia, marriage declined from its pre-war
level up until the end of the Khmer Rouge regime
due to excess mortality among young men [28, 29].
After the fall of the Khmer Rouge, however, both
studies reported a marriage ‘boom’ among younger
aged women, a result of increased competition for the
remaining men. Closely related with partner unavail-
ability, the breakdown of social networks due to con-
flict appears to negatively impact upon marriage rates
among young women. For example, in Bosnia, the
lack of social embeddedness caused by the genocide
was believed to have dramatically decreased the odds
of marriage during the war [15].
Impact of conflict on fertility
Three studies reported little change in young women’s
fertility during a period of conflict [15, 26, 31], three
studies reported a decline [18, 19, 29, 32], five studies an
overall increase in fertility [15, 22, 32–34] and one study
reported differential changes among sub-groups of
young women [30].
The majority of studies indicated that fertility trends
were strongly influenced by the shifting trends in mar-
riage observed among young women during time of con-
flict (albeit with a time lag to take account of gestation).
Increase in fertility
Clifford [22] reported birth rates among 15 to 19 years
old women prior to, and during, the period of conflict in
Tajikistan, finding there to be a steady increase in fertil-
ity among the young during the war years. Increases in
fertility among young women under 20 years were also
evident during the first Intifada in the West Bank and
Gaza; Fargues [32] identified a sharp increase in fertility
between 1985 and 1991 in both regions. Likewise,
Khawaja [33] and Khawaja and Randall [34] examined
fertility during the first Intifada. Between 1968 and 1991,
teenage fertility increased by 700 % in Gaza and 300 %
in the West Bank, with the greatest increase occurring
during the Intifada period; similar increases were not,
however, evident among refugee and non-refugee popu-
lations in Jordan. The authors concluded that the rise in
Palestinian fertility resulted largely from a surge in mar-
riage and, to a lesser extent, from higher marital fertility
possibly due to curfews and closures leading to increased
opportunity for sexual activity.
Staveteig [15] revealed that young women between 15
and 19 years at the start of the Rwandan genocide were
more likely to have a first birth before they reached the
age of 20 than were the two earlier cohorts (those aged
between 20 and 24 and between 25 and 29 at the start of
the conflict). Fertility returned to normal levels post
genocide.
Decline in fertility
In other contexts, a decline in fertility has been observed
during periods of conflict. In Bangladesh, Curlin et al.
[31] identified a sharp fall in fertility among young
women during the war which continued two years post-
conflict. For example, the age specific fertility rates
(ASFRs) among Bangladeshi young women aged 10 to
14 years declined from a high of 16.4 births per 1000
5 years before the war, to 4.6, and 5.5 per 1000 during
the period of conflict and two years post-conflict, re-
spectively. In Cambodia, marital fertility rates were also
shown to fall among 15 to 19 year old women during
the Khmer Rouge regime [29]; however, fertility rose
rapidly after the fall of the Khmer Rouge in line with
marriage rates. The authors concluded that the desire
for children (by all aged women) post-conflict occurred
in order to guarantee family, social and population sta-
bility and cohesion. Further, the costs of raising children
remained comparatively low.
In Eritrea, fertility among 15 to 19 year olds fell during
the period of conflict, and particularly among those at
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the younger ages [18, 19]; for example, 22 % of 17 year
olds had started childbearing in 1995 compared to 8 %
in 2002, and similar reductions were observed amongst
16 year olds. The observed decline in ASFRs, however,
was less than among older aged women and appeared to
be part of a longer term general trend in fertility reduc-
tion. The author concluded that the fall was partly due
to increase in age at marriage but also due to conflict
spousal separation; in 1995, 60 % of married 15 to
19 year old women resided with their husbands, whereas
by 2002 this had fallen to 31 %.
Khawaja et al. [30] examined the impact of the second
Intifada on fertility in Gaza and the West Bank to find
that, unlike the first, ASFRs declined across the two ter-
ritories between 1999 and 2003. The decline occurred
among all women, but was least among those aged be-
tween 15 and 19 years. Further examination revealed
that, among young women aged between 15 and 19 years
with little education, fertility actually rose during the
period of the second Intifada.
Stagnation in patterns of marriage or fertility
One article showed the immediate effect of war was to
stall both declines in adolescent fertility and marriage. In
1967, the legal age of marriage was raised in Iran, a fam-
ily planning programme was introduced and abortion
legalised in an attempt to reduce population growth.
Consequently, fertility in the country began to decline,
particularly among older women, alongside increasing
age at first marriage [35]. Following the revolution in
1979, Islamic republic officials stated women’s primary
role was marriage and child-raising and the family plan-
ning programme was shut down. As the war with Iraq
continued in the early 1980s the supply of imported
goods and food declined and rationing was introduced
on the basis of family size; in 1976, the ASFR was 150
births per 1000 15 to 19 years old women compared to
149 per 1000 in 1986. Although this was not a deliberate
pro-natalist policy it operated as an incentive to have
more children and thus caused a stalling of the pre-
revolution fertility transition. It is interesting to note
that a further study by the same author found the pro-
portion of women married aged between 15 and 19 year
olds during this period increased slightly in urban areas
but fell in rural areas [20]. The author suggested this is
because of increasing emphasis on traditional gender
norms in urban areas while, in rural areas, young men
migrated leading to a sex imbalance.
Randall’s [26] analyses showed that, despite an increase
in early marriage during the conflict in Mali, fertility
rates among 12 to 14 and 15 to 19 year olds did not ap-
pear to change. In Bosnia Herzegovina, fertility also ap-
peared to remain relatively stable during the period of
conflict [15]. After the war, however, there was a marked
decline which reflected a shift in marriage patterns.
Discussion
Summary of findings
The 21 papers included in our study present quantitative
evidence for armed conflict having an impact on marriage
and births to young women under the age of 20 years at
the national or sub-national level. There are examples of
both increases and declines in Asia and Africa, and in the
Gaza and West Bank there are actually different directions
of effect for two different conflicts.
Table 3 shows a summary of the possible causal path-
ways through which conflict can influence marriage
grouped within the three themes identified earlier: invol-
untary, gender and psychosocial and economic and mater-
ial. We focus on marriage because changes in fertility
were all associated with changes in marriage patterns.
However, we recognise that this may not always be the
case (e.g. fertility may rise due to births out of wedlock, or
marital fertility patterns may change). We only have one
study which examines marital fertility, and this suggests
changes in fertility post conflict result from differing rates
of coital frequency [29]. In some cases, the pathway may
Table 3 Summary of suggested causal pathways relating to marriage
Involuntary Gender and psycho-social Economic and material
Marriage
increase
Increased opportunity for social
contact between the sexes
Fear of sexual violence or loss of honour
for unmarried women leads to marriage at
younger ages
Disruption in girls schooling leading to earlier
marriage/childbirth
Increased competition for remaining
males as marriage partners
Desire for increased social cohesion Increased poverty leading to transactional
marriages/early marriage to gain bride price
Increased pro-natalism and conservatism
supports early marriage and childbirth
Marriage
decrease
Disruption and separation of
the sexes
Cost of marriage, lack of employment
opportunities and destruction of
infrastructure
Lack of available males due to conscription
and differential mortality
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be quite simple; for example, marriages are postponed due
to separation of partners or more pressing concerns, or in-
creased poverty may make marriage celebrations un-
affordable during conflict.
In other cases, however, age of marriage may be ma-
nipulated to mitigate some of the potential risks and
threats of conflict. This may result in changes in norms
around age of marriage and birth as the underlying cul-
tural and social practices interact with particular aspects
of conflict to influence potential outcomes of marriage
age. Increasing early marriage in Syria, for example, ap-
pears to have occurred as a convergence of concerns
about unmarried women’s honour and safety in times of
turmoil and violence alongside potential opportunities
for financial benefit as a result of cultural norms around
bride price for the family in times of conflict-induced
poverty. Increasing early marriage during conflict tends
to occur in contexts where cultural practices, norms and
values already support it - although in some cases ideol-
ogy fuelled by the conflict may additionally reinforce
conservative attitudes (e.g. in Gaza and West Bank and
Iraq); Eritrea, however, offers an exception to this gen-
eral trend.
Norms of age of marriage prior to the war will affect
the extent to which changes in the age of marriage will
affect young people. If the norm is that most women
marry between the ages of 20 and 24 years, a significant
proportion of women who are this age group at the out-
break of conflict will be already married; any pathways
for change will impact on those at an age ‘preparing’ for
marriage; that is, those at the younger end of the 20 to
24 years age group and those under 20 years. This is a
particularly important concept when considering how
conflict can increase early marriages; these data highlight
the importance of disaggregating data by age for adoles-
cents in further studies.
It is also important to acknowledge that there are a
number of papers which provide more general informa-
tion about the impact of conflict on rates of marriage or
fertility based on a wider age group. Our paper focuses
on changes in patterns for those under the age of
20 years as this is the group who are most likely to ex-
perience adverse impacts from these events, so papers
that did not specifically provide data on this age group
were excluded. However, these excluded papers provide
important contextual information that can support and
extend our analysis: A study by Williams et al. [36]
found an increased likelihood of marriage for women
aged beween 15 and 24 years exposed to conflict in
Nepal, which supports Valente’s findings of increased
marriage amongst women under the age of 20 years
[24]. Lindstrom and Berhanu’s [37] findings of a short term
reductions in fertility in response to upheaval in Ethiopia
complement Blanc and Woldemichael’s [18, 19, 27]
findings on a reduction in marriage before 20 years of age
in response to conflict. A study by Khlat et al. [38] found a
reduction in fertility in wartime Beirut, which again aligns
well with Saxena’s findings on reduced rates of marriage
before 20 years of age during conflict in Lebanon [21].
Jayaraman et al. [39] suggest exposure to the Rwan-
dan Genocide resulted in a decrease in fertility which
initially seems at variance with Staveteig [15], but Jayara-
man utilises more complex methods that identify levels of
exposure to conflict compared to Staveteig’s analysis of
temporal trends within the whole population, so the stud-
ies are not comparable. A further study by Verwimp [40]
found an increase in fertility among women who became
refugees as a result of the genocide, highlighting how
complex patterns are likely to vary between different
population groups.
The difficulties of measuring exposure to conflict
Our review has a number of limitations rooted in meth-
odological and practical difficulties associated with
measuring exposure to conflict. Nearly all of the results
in this study were based on time trends for national level
data, but this does not acknowledge that some sectors of
the population were much more affected by the conflict
than others; Shemyakina’s work [16, 17] suggests that
marriage patterns may be quite different in areas af-
fected to greater and lesser degrees by the armed con-
flict. One of the two studies that attempted to address
this was Valente [24], who used measures of between-
district conflict intensity. Improved monitoring and
reporting of conflicts through projects such as the
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) -
which provide georeferenced data of events - makes
such approaches more feasible. More sophisticated ap-
proaches are emerging; for example, Williams et al. [36]
examined population responses to armed conflict using
an approach that decomposes the conflict in Nepal into
discrete political and violent events, and estimated dif-
ferential risk within the population. Jamayraman [39]
measured the impact of conflict on marriage and fertility
using small area level data on mortality of siblings in
Rwanda. These methods still have limitations; for ex-
ample, they do not deal well with internal mobility be-
tween time points.
Even when studies are able to measure exposure to
conflict more accurately, there are also particular groups
within populations who are more or less vulnerable to
the potential effects of conflict. Most studies are at the
population level which may result in these differences
being lost. It is highly possible that there could be differ-
ent impacts in different populations within the same
country, but efforts would need to disaggregate popula-
tions to detect these.
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Examination of time trends also does not enable the
separation of the impact of conflict from secular trends
or other contemporaneous factors. Techniques such as
difference-in-difference modelling may offer some ad-
vantages in establishing a clearer association, but there
are still difficulties in unravelling the impact of armed
conflict from that of the wider concurrent socio-
economic turbulence and uncertainty. While this paper
focuses on armed conflict, other studies have found
changes in fertility and nuptuality occur during other pe-
riods of non-violent turmoil and social change, and it is
very challenging to establish the extent to which the
presence of violence drives change. Clifford [22] pre-
sented findings of trends from four newly independent
states during the turbulent period of the early post-
Soviet era; while only two of the countries experienced
armed conflict, all four countries demonstrated very
similar trends in marriage, suggesting that caution is
needed before attributing change specifically to
hostilities.
Difficulties in measuring indicators
Many of the studies rely on retrospective data from sur-
veys or censuses which are acknowledged to have diffi-
culties with the measurement of marriage, first births
and sexual debut. Surveys such as the DHS employ a
loose definition of marriage which will include legal and
‘traditional’ marriages, as well as consensual unions with
cohabitation [41]. In cultures where such unions are
more fluid, data quality on marriage is likely to be com-
promised [42]. Measures of young people’s SRH events
are also likely to be subject to social desirability bias; re-
spondents may feel the need to adjust their responses to
ensure they are viewed favourably by others. In addition,
in a number of studies, data from different age cohorts
from a single survey were used to ascertain trends,
which can be problematic as it can introduce bias, in-
cluding the overstating of age [43].
Understanding longer term outcomes
To fully understand the association between conflict and
a reduction in early marriage, cohorts need to be
followed up for some time after the cessation of hostil-
ities in order to ascertain whether marriage is simply
postponed to an older age group and/or these young
women remain unmarried. As previously discussed, sev-
eral studies that permit this suggest the decrease in mar-
riage during conflict is followed by a marriage ‘boom’
after the end of the conflict [28, 29], a pattern supported
more broadly for other studies on fertility and marital
rates among post-conflict populations [44].
However, there is evidence from other studies that did
not meet our specific criteria that, in some cases post-
conflict, women may be less likely to marry [45] and, in
cultures where marriage provide protection and status,
this may be extremely damaging for a woman’s future
security. It is important that post-war reconstruction ef-
forts understand and respond to the needs of young
women who may be marrying later than the societal
norm or remaining single; opportunities for education
and livelihood opportunities are needed to ensure their
security both in the short and the longer term. Con-
versely, we do not understand whether increases in teen
marriage and fertility experienced during conflict persist
after the cessation of hostilities; given that many of the
factors driving this trend (e.g. increased poverty and in-
security and loss of livelihoods) may continue into the
post-war period this is highly possible. In Randall’s study
[26] the marriage rate in very young girls reverted to
normal quickly whereas, in Clifford’s study [22], the rate
of marriage stayed elevated for some time. Again it is
important to incorporate strategies into post-conflict re-
construction to protect young women who may con-
tinue to be at risk of early marriage, as well as to
support those who have already been married.
The importance of qualitative data in understanding
young women’s SRH in conflict
One of the marked limitations of this review arises be-
cause its primary aim was to document quantitative
change in rates of SRH events in women aged under
20 years; it therefore excluded qualitative studies that
would have been valuable in developing insight into the
pathways through which conflict can influence these
outcomes. As such, we acknowledge that our analysis is
incomplete; in particular, in all the studies we examined
marriage and fertility are closely linked. This may not al-
ways be the case, and it is probable that, in some con-
texts, change in fertility may be driven by patterns of
fertility outside marriage. In addition, this review cannot
describe how the meaning and context of our chosen in-
dicators changed as a result of conflict; for instance,
Muhwezi et al. [3] described how a breakdown of com-
munity cohesion resulting from armed conflict in
Uganda brought about a complete change in cultural
values, with increases in transactional sex and marriage,
sexual violence and high risk sexual behaviours such as
multiple partners. Other studies [46, 47] document the
rise of forced marriage in some contexts where women
are abducted by the militia; such ‘marriages’, where there
is the full consent of neither the woman nor her family,
clearly differ from traditional practices, but most quanti-
tative data sources would not be able to differentiate
these from other forms of marriage. We are planning a
further study which will review a broader range of litera-
ture to build on our preliminary analysis of causal path-
ways, as well as outline how the nature of these events
may change.
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Conclusion
The aim of a systematic review is to explore the quality
and quantity of research on a specific topic, while avoid-
ing the undue influence of pre-conceived notions of
what might be found. This review has highlighted a rela-
tive lack of high quality studies as well as a rather nar-
row range of methodological approaches and limited
contexts and scope. This comment is certainly not
meant as a criticism of past researchers’ efforts; high
quality research in this - and similar - areas is extremely
challenging, and may simply be beyond the reach of sci-
entific endeavour using ‘gold standard’ approaches. How-
ever, we have highlighted a range of novel approaches
which have been utilised by researchers to examine
other demographic outcomes in conflict situations, and
we suggest that these could be extended to examine
early fertility and marriage.
Having said this, some tentative conclusions can be
drawn based on this review. First, the effects of armed
conflict on early marriage and child birth are inconsist-
ent, and appear to vary according to a range of psycho-
social, economic and conflict-related factors. Second,
little work has been carried out that enables more de-
tailed understanding of specific impacts on different
groups, disaggregated, for example, by age, by rural or
urban residence, by family structures, by level of poverty.
Third, we came across no work that increased under-
standing of community- or individual-level factors or
circumstances that increased resilience in the face of
armed conflict.
We recommend that future research make better use
of a wider range of methods to understand the dynamics
of the actual and potential impact of armed conflict on
young women’s sexual and reproductive health out-
comes. Qualitative approaches can be designed to gener-
ate deeper understanding of patterns observed from
survey analysis, and/or to generate new ways of under-
standing factors that are not currently captured in trad-
itional survey items. Furthermore, the quality of survey
data can be improved by strong training and supervision
of fieldworkers, as well as expansion of conflict-related
indicators. Ideally, some form of triangulation of data
can be achieved by mixed method approaches, and
greater use of penetrative methods should enable stron-
ger conceptual clarification.
Improved understanding is urgently needed to support
and guide the efforts of support and rehabilitation agen-
cies; there is clearly much more to do.
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